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NOTE
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.: Skirting
the Legislative History of the Warsaw
Convention
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 1983, over the Sea of Japan, a Soviet Union mili-
tary aircraft destroyed a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 en route from
Kennedy Airport in New York to Seoul, South Korea. All 269 persons
on board the plane were killed.'
The Warsaw Convention ("Convention"),2 a multilateral treaty gov-
erning the international carriage of passengers, baggage, and cargo by
air, provides a per passenger damage limitation for personal injury or
death. The Convention further provides that passenger tickets must in-
clude notice of this limitation, and a private accord among airlines
known as the Montreal Agreement ("Agreement") states that this notice
shall be in print size no smaller than 10-point type.3 In Chan v. Korean
Air Lines, Ltd.,' the United States Supreme Court held that international
air carriers do not lose the benefit of the Warsaw Convention's damages
limitation if they fail to provide notice of that limitation. Accordingly,
the liability of Korean Air Lines was limited to $75,000 per passenger.
I N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by
Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1982)
[hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. For the text of the relevant portions of the Warsaw Convention,
see infra notes 28, 74 and 105.
3 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Proto-
col, Agreement CAB 18,900, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 note (1982), reprinted in Civil Aeronautics Board,
Aeronautical Statutes and Related Material 515-16 (1974) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement]. For
the text of the relevant portion of the Montreal Agreement, see infra note 24.
4 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989).
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This Note first explores the majority and concurring opinions in
Chan and concludes that the Court erred in enabling a carrier to benefit
from the Warsaw Convention's damage limitation when the carrier has
failed to warn its passengers of that limitation. This Note further dis-
cusses how the Court created a confusing and disturbing precedent by
failing to interpret the Montreal Agreement in conjunction with the
Warsaw Convention, and by wrongly relying on a literal reading of the
Warsaw Convention. for its conclusions. Finally, this Note asserts that
the concurrence in Chan correctly resolved the fundamental issue by ex-
amining the drafting history of the Convention and concluding that an
international air carrier cannot receive the benefit of the Convention's
damage limitation if it fails to provide adequate notice of that limitation
on passenger tickets. The concurrence failed, however, to appreciate the
relationship between the Montreal Agreement and the Convention and
replaced a clear standard of adequate notice with an unclear standard.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines ("KAL") Flight KE 007,
a Boeing 747, departed from Kennedy Airport in New York bound for
Seoul, South Korea. Instead of following the prescribed safe route over
international waters, the pilots flew the plane more than three hundred
miles off course into the airspace of the Soviet Union.5 The plane was
tracked, deliberately fired upon, and destroyed over the Sea of Japan by a
Soviet military fighter aircraft.6 All 269 persons on board the plane were
killed.7
Family members and estate representatives of victims of flight KE
007 filed wrongful death actions against KAL in several United States
District Courts. These actions were transferred for pretrial proceedings
to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.' All
parties agreed that their rights were governed by the Warsaw
Convention.9
The controversy centered on the per passenger damages limitation
5 N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1983, at 4, col. 1.
6 Id., Sept. 2, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
7 IM., Sept. 3, 1983, at 1, col. 5.
8 The actions were transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The statute provides in part:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different
districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation au-
thorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and will provide for the just and efficient conduct of
such actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
9 Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1678.
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for personal injury or death. 10 This limit was initially fixed in 1934 by
the Warsaw Convention at approximately $8,300." In 1966, the limit
was raised to $75,000 by the Montreal Agreement, an agreement exe-
cuted and approved by the United States Civil Aeronautics Board.12 In
addition to providing for a higher damages limitation, the Montreal
Agreement required carriers to give passengers written notice of the Con-
vention's damage limitation in print size no smaller than 10-point type.' 3
However, notice of the Convention's liability rules for flight KE 007 ap-
peared on KE 007's passenger tickets in only 8-point type. 14 Through a
motion for partial summary judgment, the petitioners sought a declara-
tion that this discrepancy deprived KAL of the benefit of the damages
limitation. ' 5
On July 25, 1985, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia denied the motion, finding that neither the Warsaw Conven-
tion nor the Montreal Agreement prescribes that the sanction for failure
to provide notice in print size no smaller than 10-point type is the elimi-
nation of the damages limitation. 16 The Court's opinion specifically con-
sidered and rejected a contrary Second Circuit decision. 7
On September 24, 1985, the District Court certified for interlocutory
appeal the question whether KAL is entitled to benefit from the limita-
tion of damages provided by the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal
Agreement despite its defective tickets. 8 The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court allowed the appeal and affirmed, adopting the District Court's
opinion in full.' 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conffict among the Courts of Appeals.20 The Supreme Court noted that
in addition to the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit was in disagreement
10 Id.
11 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2.
12 Montreal Agreement, supra note 3.
13 Id
14 The difference between 8-point type and 10-point type is 1/36th of an inch, based on 72 type
points to the inch.
15 Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1678.
16 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 19 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) 17,584 (D.D.C.
1985).
17 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. den., 464 U.S. 845
(1983). For a discussion of Warsaw, see infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
18 Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1679. The District Court certified for interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
19 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
20 485 U.S. 986 (1988).
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with the District of Columbia Circuit's resolution.21
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. Majority Opinion
In Chan, the majority, by a five to four margin, held that interna-
tional air carriers do not lose the benefit of the Warsaw Convention's
damages limitation if they fail to provide adequate notice of that limita-
tion.22 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that the only time a
carrier is subjected to unlimited liability is when it "accepts a passenger
without a passenger ticket having been delivered."23
Petitioners, family members and estate representatives of eighteen
passengers killed in the catastrophe, conceded that by itself, the Montreal
Agreement imposed no sanction for failure to comply with its 10-point
type requirement.24 They argued, however, that such a requirement is
created by reading the Montreal Agreement in conjunction with the
Warsaw Convention. 2  Their argument proceeded in two steps. First,
21 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986).
For a discussion of New Orleans, see infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
22 Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1684.
23 Id. at 1680. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
O'Connor, and Kennedy. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined.
24 Id. at 1679. The relevant portion of the Montreal Agreement provides:
2. Each carrier shall, at the time of delivery of the ticket, furnish to each passenger whose
transportation is governed by the Convention... the following notice, which shall be printed in
types at least as large as 10 point and in ink contrasting with the stock on (i) each ticket; (ii) a
piece of paper either placed in the ticket envelope with the ticket or attached to the ticket; or
(iii) on the ticket envelope:
ADVICE TO INTERNATIONAL PASSENGERS ON LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Passengers on a journey involving an ultimate destination or a stop in a country other than
the country of origin are advised that the provisions of a treaty known as the Warsaw Conven-
tion may be applicable to the entire journey, including any portion entirely within the country
of origin or destination. For such passengers on a journey to, from, or with an agreed stopping
place in the United States of America, the Convention and special contracts of carriage embod-
ied in applicable tariffs provide that the liability of certain (name the carrier) and certain other*
carriers parties to such special contracts for death of or personal injury to passengers is limited
in most cases to proven damages not to exceed US $75,000 per passenger, and that this liability
up to such limit shall not depend on negligence on the part of the carrier. For such passengers
travelling by a carrier not a party to such special contracts or on a journey not to, from, or
having an agreed stopping place in the United States of America, liability of the carrier for
death or personal injury to passengers is limited in most cases to approximately US $8,290 or
US $16,580.
The names of Carriers parties to such special contracts are available at all ticket offices of
such carriers and may be examined on request.
Additional protection can usually be obtained by purchasing insurance from a private com-
pany. Such insurance is not affected by any limitation of the carrier's liability under the War-
saw Convention or such special contracts of carriage. For further information please consult
your airline or insurance company representative.
*Either alternative may be used. Montreal Agreement, supra note 3.
25 Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1679.
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they asserted that Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention removes the pro-
tection of limited liability if a carrier fails to provide adequate notice of
the Convention's liability limitation in its passenger tickets. Second, they
contended that the Montreal Agreement's 10-point type requirement
supplies the standard of adequate notice under Article 3 of the Warsaw
Convention.26 Because the Court rejected the first point, it did not reach
the second.2 7
Justice Scalia began the majority opinion by quoting the relevant
portion of the Warsaw Convention.21 In particular, Justice Scalia ex-
amined the first and second sentences of Article 3(2) of the Convention.
According to his analysis, all that the second sentence of Article 3(2)
requires in order to avoid its sanction is the delivery of a passenger ticket.
Justice Scalia continued:
Expanding this to mean "a passenger ticket in compliance with the require-
ments of this Convention" is rendered implausible by the first sentence of
Article 3(2), which specifies that "[t]he... irregularity... of the passenger
ticket shall not affect the existence or the validity of the contract of trans-
portation, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of this
convention.",
2 9
Justice Scalia then noted that in addition to being incompatible with
the language of the Convention, the proposition that delivery of a defec-
tive ticket is equivalent to failure to deliver a ticket, produces an absurd
results.Y Such an interpretation would require that even a minor defect




28 Id. at 1679-80. Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carriers must deliver a passenger ticket which
shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve the right to alter the
stopping places in case of necessity, and that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not
have the effect of depriving the transportation of its international character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability estab-
lished by this convention.
(2) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the passenger ticket shall not affect the existence or
the validity of the contract of transportation, which shall none the less be subject to the rules of
this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket hav-
ing been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions of this convention
which exclude or limit his liability. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 3.
29 Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1680.
30 Id. at 1681.
31 Id. at 1681-82. Justice Scalia argued:
It may seem reasonable enough that a carrier "shall not be entitled to avail himself of those
provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability" when the ticket defect consists
Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd
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The majority further found that comparison of Article 3(2) with
other provisions of the Convention provides additional proof that defec-
tive compliance with the notice provision does not eliminate the liability
limitation. 2 Justice Scalia observed that Sections II and III of the Con-
vention provide parallel rules to Section I, including a liability limitation
and a notice requirement for baggage checks and air waybills for cargo.33
The majority pointed out, however, that Sections I, II, and III are identi-
cal in their requirements, but not in their remedies. Section I, which
includes Article 3, provides no explicit remedy, yet Sections II and III
specifically waive liability limits for the airline's failure to include the
notice requirements in the documents.34 Given the parallel structure of
these three sections, the majority stated that "it would be a flouting of the
text to imply in Section I a sanction not only withheld there but explicitly
granted elsewhere."3"
Justice Scalia then noted that while the Convention's drafting his-
tory may be "consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous," the Court
has no power to insert an amendment into a treaty where the text is
clear.3 6 Here, concluded Justice Scalia, the text is clear: "[T]he Warsaw
Convention does not eliminate the limitation on damages for passenger
injury or death as a sanction for failure to provide adequate notice of that
limitation., 37
B. Concurring Opinion
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Ste-
vens, concurred in the Court's judgment but disagreed with much of the
Court's analysis. In contrast to the majority, Justice Brennan stated that
he is prepared to accept the petitioners' argument that the Warsaw Con-
vention does sanction failure to provide notice of its applicability with
precisely of a failure to give the passenger proper notice of those provisions. But there is no
textual basis for limiting the "defective-ticket-is-no-ticket" principle to that particular defect.
Thus, the liability limitation would also be eliminated if the carrier failed to comply, for exam-
ple, with the requirement of Article 3(1)(d) that the ticket contain the address of the carrier. Id.
32 I at 1682.
33 Id. A "waybill" is "a document that is prepared by the carrier transporting a shipment of
goods that contains such information as the nature of the shipment, the name of its consignor and its
consignee, its origin, route, destination, and the charges paid, and that serves as a means of identifi-
cation, a guide for routing, and a basis for freight accounting and almost all other carrier records and
statistics. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 2588 (3d ed. 1966).
34 Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1682. Article 4(4) of Section II of the Warsaw Convention provides that if
the baggage check does not contain notice of the liability limitation, the carrier shall not avail itself
of the Convention's liability limitations. Article 9 of Section III of the Convention provides a similar
rule for air waybills. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, arts. 4(4), 9.
35 Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1683.
36 Id at 1683-84.
37 Id. at 1684.
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loss of its limit on liability.3' However, Justice Brennan did not accept
the position that Korean Air Line's 8-point notice was inadequate, as a
matter of interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, "simply because of
the carrier's obligation under a related agreement to provide 10-point
notice."3 9 Justice Brennan concluded that the notice given by KAL was
adequate. He therefore concurred in the Court's judgment that KAL did
not lose the benefit of the Convention's limit on liability.
Justice Brennan rejected the petitoners' contention that the Mon-
treal Agreement established a bright line which should be taken to define
what notice is adequate. The Montreal Agreement, argued Justice Bren-
nan, "is a private agreement among airline companies, which cannot and
does not purport to amend the Warsaw Convention."' He explained:
[T]he Agreement was concluded under pressure from the United States
Government, which would otherwise have withdrawn from the Warsaw
Convention. And most air carriers operating in the United States are re-
quired by Federal Aviation Regulations to become parties to the agreement.
But neither the Montreal Agreement nor the federal regulations purport to
sanction failure to provide notice according to the Agreement's specifica-
tions with loss of the Warsaw Convention's limits on liability. The sanc-
tion, rather, can be only whatever penalty is available to the FAA against
foreign airlines that fail to abide by the applicable regulations, presumably
including suspension or revocation of the airline's permit to operate in the
United States.41
Justice Brennan began the concurrence by noting that the majority
held that "the sanction of Article 3(2), which consists of the loss of the
Convention's limitation on liability under Article 22(1), applies only
when no passenger ticket at all is delivered." 2 Justice Brennan argued
that while this is a plausible reading of the Convention, it is not the only
possible reading. Where more than one plausible reading exists, it is
proper to consider the evidence found in the Convention's drafting his-
tory on the intent of the drafters of the document. 3
Justice Brennan next observed that strong evidence exists which in-
dicates that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention may have meant
something other than what the majority determined the Convention to
mean.' The intent of Article 3(2), contended Justice Brennan, is "to
hold the carrier to the obligations, but to deny it the benefits, of the Con-
38 Id. at 1693 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
39 Id.
40 Id at 1692 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
41 Id. (citations omitted).
42 Id. at 1684 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
43 Id. at 1685 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
44 Id.
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vention, if it fails to comply with certain requirements."4 5 Thus, Article
3 does not necessarily exclude the interpretation that failure to provide
the required notice will result in a loss of the limitation on liability.4
The concurrence then turned to the drafting history of the Conven-
tion for further indications of the intent of the contracting governments
regarding the consequences of inadequate notice of the damage limita-
tion.4 7 In particular, the concurrence examined the final draft submitted
to the Warsaw Conference by the Comiti International Technique
d'Experts Juridiques Adriens ("CITEJA"), the committee of experts who
drafted the Warsaw Convention. The concurrence noted that while the
final text of the Convention clearly imposes sanctions for omission of the
notice requirement in Article 4 (which specifies what information must
be included in baggage checks), Article 3 (which specifies what informa-
tion must be included in passenger tickets) is ambiguous on this point.48
This is not the case, however, in the draft CITEJA presented to the War-
saw Conference. In the CITEJA draft, the sanction of removing the
damages ceiling applies more clearly to the failure to give notice in pas-
senger tickets than to the failure to give notice in baggage checks.4 9
Justice Brennan then stated:
If there was any reason, therefore, for according the notice requirement less
weight in Article 3 than in Article 4, it must have emerged at the Warsaw
Convention itself. But there is no trace of such a purpose in the Warsaw
minutes, as there surely would have been had a decision been made to re-
verse the relative treatment of the Article 3 and 4 sanctions provisions in
the previous draft. It seems much more likely, therefore, that the difference
between Articles 3 and 4 on this point was an unintended consequence of
other changes that were made at the conference.5 0
The concurrence next observed that even if Article 3 of the Warsaw
Convention does remove the liability limit for failure to provide notice of
the Convention's liability provision, the petitioners' argument requires
the Court to determine whether there exists a requirement that the notice
given be "adequate," and, if so, whether the notice provided by Korean
Air Lines met that standard.5
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1685-86 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan stated, "The
Court's difficulty in accepting this point... results precisely from the misplaced literalism and
disregard of context already evident in its approach to this treaty." Id. at 1686 n.5 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
47 Ia at 1686 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1690 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
50 IaL (footnote omitted).
51 Id. at 1691 (Brennan, 3., concurring in the judgment).
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The concurrence argued that if notice is indeed required, it must
certainly meet some minimal standard of "adequacy." 2 Justice Brennan
stated that "notice that literally could be read only with a magnifying
glass would be no notice at all."" Justice Brennan concluded, however,
that the 8-point notice provision at issue in Chan was clearly "adequate"
under any accepted interpretation of that term.54
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. The Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement
1. Pre- Warsaw Convention Proceedings
The Warsaw Convention of 1929 was the product of an effort initi-
ated by France to achieve an accord on private aviation law. 5 In 1925,
forty-five nations sent delegates to Paris to participate in the first interna-
tional Conference on Private Aviation Law.56 The delegates approved of
a draft agreement prepared by France which provided for a limitation on
air carrier liability and for the establishment of both passenger tickets
and air waybills.57 CITEJA, a committee of experts on private aviation
law, was created to develop a draft agreement to be submitted to the
conferees at a future conference.5 8 At its third session, held in May 1928,
52 Id. at 1692 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1693 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
55 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Chan v. Korean Air
Lines, Ltd., 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989) (No. 87-1055) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
56 See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 401 (1985). This effort paralleled the effort concerning
public aviation law which culminated in the International Convention for Aerial Navigation,
adopted in Paris on October 13, 1919. See Sack, International Unification of Private Law Rules on
Air Transportation and the Warsaw Convention, 4 AIR L. REv. 345, 345-346 (1933); Cha, The Air
Carrier's Liability to Passengers in International Law, 7 Am L. REv. 25, 28 (1936); Ide, The History
and Accomplishments of the International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts
(CLT.E.J.A), 3 J. AIR L. 27, (1932); See also D. BILLYoU, AIR LAW 16-18 (2d ed. 1964).
57 Amicus Brief, supra note 55 at 4 (citing the travaux preparatoires, documents relevant to the
Warsaw Convention's drafting history). The original documents, including their English transla-
tions, are located in the National Archives, in RG 59, Boxes 5620 aid 5621.
58 Id. See generally M. SMIRNorF, LE COMITE INTERNATIONAL TECHNIQUE D'EXPERTS
JURiDIQUEs ARIENS (C..TE.J.A.) (1936). CITEJA established four commissions to draft agree-
ments for CITEJA's full consideration. The issues of the air waybill and the liability of the air
carrier towards shippers of goods and passengers were assigned to the Second Commission.
In April 1927, at CITEJA's second session, the Second Commission submitted a draft agree-
ment concerning the form of the air waybill, which CITEJA approved, with revisions. However,
CITEJA also asked the Second Commission to prepare a draft agreement joining the waybill agree-
ment with an agreement on the liability of air carriers. In March 1928, the Second Commission met
and prepared a new draft that included articles dealing with passenger tickets and baggage checks in
a manner paralleling the provisions previously formulated for waybills. Amicus Brief, supra note 55,
at 4 (citing the travaux preparatoires).
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CITEJA approved a draft for submission to member nations at a confer-
ence to be held in Warsaw.59
2. The Warsaw Convention
In 1929 in Warsaw, during the Second International Conference on
Private Aviation Law, the delegates adopted a revised version of
CITEJA's final draft, now known as the Warsaw Convention.6' Chapter
II of the Convention, entitled "Transportation Documents," establishes
the requirements for passenger tickets (Article 3), baggage checks (Arti-
cle 4), and air waybills (Articles 5-16), including their legal effect and
operation, information that must be contained in each, and sanctions for
violation of the Convention's requirements regarding such documents.6"
Under Article 3(1), the carrier must deliver a "ticket" to the passen-
ger, which must contain a "statement that the transportation is subject to
the rules relating to liability established by th[e] convention."62 If, under
Article 3(2), a "carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket
having been delivered," the carrier is "not... entitled to avail himself of
those provisions of th[e] convention which exclude or limit his
liability. ' 63
Under Article 22, the Convention establishes limitations on air car-
rier liability for any injury to passengers, and for damage to checked
baggage or goods. The liability limitation for passengers was 125,000
francs (then approximately $8,300).6 Articles 20 and 21 provide the
carrier with certain defenses to liability claims, and Article 25 removes
the liability limitation "if the damage is caused by ... wilful miscon-
duct."' 65 Finally, Article 39 gives a nation the right to formally withdraw
from the Convention effective six months after notice of its denunciation.
The United States became a party to the Warsaw Convention in
1934, following a vote in the Senate.66 There were no congressional hear-
ings, reports, or debates on the Convention.67
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, arts. 3-16.
62 Id. art. 3(1)(e).
63 Id. art. 3(2).
64 Anicus Brief, supra note 55, at 5.
65 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 25.
66 See 78 CONG. REc. 11,582 (1934); see generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States
and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497, 502 (1967) [hereinafter Lowenfeld &
Mendelsohn].
67 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 273 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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3. Post- Warsaw Convention Proceedings and the Montreal Agreement
In 1955, the Hague Protocol was drafted at an international confer-
ence at The Hague, Netherlands."8 The Hague Protocol amended the
Warsaw Convention in two important respects. First, the liability limita-
tion was approximately doubled to 250,000 francs (currently worth ap-
proximately $20,000). Second, certain air carriers' defenses were
eliminated.6 9 The United States declined to ratify the Hague Protocol
because it found insufficient the increase in liability limits for claims in-
volving death or bodily injury.70
On November 15, 1965, the United States gave notice of its inten-
tion to denounce the Warsaw Convention, and thus of its intention to
withdraw in six months, pursuant to Article 39 of the Convention. At
the same time, the United States stated that it would rescind its notice of
denunciation if the contracting nations appeared likely to agree on in-
creasing the liability limit to approximately $100,000. On the eve of the
planned denunciation, the carriers agreed to a $75,000 liability limit and
to other United States demands. The United States withdrew its pro-
posed denunciation of the Convention in light of this Agreement, known
as the Montreal Agreement of 1966. 11
On May 13, 1966, the Civil Aeronautics Board announced its ap-
proval of the Montreal Agreement. 72 Under the Montreal Agreement,
virtually all air carriers conducting international flights into or out of the
United States agreed to raise the liability limit for death or bodily injury
to $75,000 per passenger.73 The carriers also agreed to waive their right
to assert the due care defense provided by Article 20(1) of the Conven-
tion.74 In addition, the carriers agreed "at the time of delivery of the
ticket, [to] furnish to each passenger whose transportation is governed by
the Convention" a notice, set out verbatim in the Agreement, advising
68 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 66, at 509.
69 Amicus Brief, supra note 55, at 5 (citation omitted). Additionally, the Conference adopted
the United States' proposal to amend Article 3 in two major respects. First, the notice requirement
in Article 3(1) was changed to demand that the ticket include a statement that the Warsaw Conven-
tion "may be applicable" if the passenger's journey involves travel in more than one country and that
the Convention "in most cases limits the liability of carriers." Second, Article 3(2) was revised to
provide that "if... the passenger embarks without a passenger ticket having been delivered, or if the
ticket does not include the notice required by ... this Article, the carrier shall not be entitled to avail
himself of the [Convention's liability limitation]." Id. at 5-6 (citation omitted).
70 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 66, at 510-16, 532-46, 564.
71 See id. at 586-96.
72 Montreal Agreement, supra note 3.
73 Id.
74 Id. Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention provides: "The carrier shall not be liable if he
proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for him or them to take such measures." Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 20(1).
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the international passenger that the Warsaw Convention's liability limi-
tations may apply to the journey. The carriers agreed to print this notice
"in types at least as large as 10 point."7 5
B. The Majority's Novel Interpretation of the Warsaw Convention:
Making the Damage Limit Available to an Airline that Fails
to Adequately Warn the Passenger
The fundamental question presented by Chan concerns what condi-
tions, if any, Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention imposes on an air car-
rier in order for the carrier to be entitled to avail itself of the
Convention's limitation on liability. The Chan majority and concurrence
arrived at different answers to this question because the treaty itself is
susceptible to two conflicting interpretations. Article 3(1) of the Conven-
tion provides that "the carriers must deliver a passenger ticket which
shall contain the following particulars," and lists among those particulars
a "statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to
liability established by this convention."76 Article 3(2) then provides
that "if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger ticket having
been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail himself of those provisions
of th[e] convention which exclude or limit his liability."" A fair reading
of these provisions, taken together, is that an air carrier has not "deliv-
ered a ticket" within the meaning of Article 3(2), unless the ticket con-
tains the required "statement" of limited liability. Thus, if the ticket
does not contain the required "statement" of limited liability, the carrier
may not avail itself of the liability limitation.78
When the treaty is considered as a whole, and when its drafting his-
tory is examined, it becomes clear that this reading, accepted by the
Chan concurrence and rejected by its majority, was the reading intended
by the treaty's authors. The text of the Warsaw Convention is not
"clear," as the majority contends.79 It is, therefore, wrong to disregard
the evidence to be found in the Convention's drafting history on the in-
tent of the governments that drafted the document. In fact, courts have
frequently examined the Convention's drafting history. In Air France v.
Saks,80 Justice O'Connor noted that the travaux preparatoires, docu-
ments relevant to the Convention's drafting history, are published and
generally available to litigants. Courts often refer to these documents to
75 Montreal Agreement, supra note 3.
76 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 3(1).
77 ArL art. 3(2).
78 Amicus Brief, supra note 55 at 13.
79 Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1683.
80 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
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resolve ambiguities in the text."
As Solicitor General Charles Fried stated in his amicus brief to the
Chan court, the travaux preparatoires show that:
[v]irtually from the outset, the persons responsible for negotiating and
drafting the treaty intended that the limitation of liability would not be
available if notice of that limitation were not included in a passenger ticket,
baggage check, or waybill. There is no compelling evidence that the treaty
drafters at any time decided to distinguish, in that regard, passenger tickets
from baggage checks and waybills.82
This view has been articulated by a number of federal appellate
courts. In affirming the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit 3
and holding that international air carriers need only to deliver a passen-
ger ticket in order to benefit from the Warsaw Convention's damage limi-
tation, the Chan majority deviated from a line of eight United States
appellate court decisions which, over a period of two decades, uniformly
held that an airline's failure to adequately warn a passenger negates the
damage limit despite delivery of a ticket.84 These appellate courts held
that adequate warning was an essential prerequisite for the damage limit
and gave the passenger an opportunity to take self-protective measures.
With adequate warning, the passenger could purchase insurance, choose
not to fly, or make a contract with the carrier for a higher limit of
liability.
In Warren v. Flying Tiger Line Inc.,85 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals examined a case in which an airplane disappeared en route from
California to Vietnam.86 The passengers were given their tickets on the
foot of the ramp leading onto the plane, at which time they were required
to board the plane immediately.8 7 Since the passengers were not afforded
a reasonable opportunity to read the tickets or obtain additional insur-
ance before they boarded the plane, the Ninth Circuit denied Flying Ti-
81 Id. at 400.
82 Amicus Brief, supra note 55, at 15.
83 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
84 See Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S.
455 (1966); In re Air Crash Disaster near New Orleans, Louisiana, 789 F.2d 1092, 1098 (5th Cir.
1986); In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 705 F.2d 85, 89-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 845 (1983); Deutsche Lufthansa v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,
341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 816 (1965); Manion v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
55 N.Y.2d 398, 434 N.E.2d 1060 (1982); Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234
N.E.2d 199 (1967).
85 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
86 The airplane "was under charter to the United States Air Force and was carrying, in addition
to its crew, ninety-six passengers, ninety-two of whom were United States soldiers." Id. at 495.
87 Id at 497.
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ger the benefit of the Convention's damage limitation. The court held
that "[tlhe passengers were... deprived of a right which was intended to
be afforded them as a concomitant to the carrier's right to limit its
liability."' 88
In Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line Ina, 9 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals examined a case similar to Warren, in which a passenger ticket
was delivered to a passenger only after he had boarded the plane. At the
time of delivery of the ticket, the plane was parked on the ramp and was
about to take off.' ° The Second Circuit held that the airline failed to
comply with its Warsaw obligations and, as a result, lost the benefit of
the Convention's damage limitation. The court stated:
We read Article 3(2) to require that the ticket be delivered to the pas-
senger in such a manner as to afford him a reasonable opportunity to take
measures to protect himself against the limitation of liability.... The deliv-
ery requirement of Article 3(2) would make little sense if it could be satis-
fied by delivering the ticket to the passenger when the aircraft was several
thousand feet in the air.91
The Second Circuit also based its conclusion that the limitation was inap-
plicable on the fact that "the statement concerning the limitation of lia-
bility was printed in such a manner as to virtually be both unnoticeable
and unreadable.. ."92
Warren and Mertens were followed by Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane,
S.p.A. v. Lisi93, a case closer to the facts of Chan. In Lisi, an Alitalia
airplane, while en route from Rome to New York, crashed shortly after
taking off from Shannon, Ireland. The limitation of liability notice given
to the passengers by Alitalia was printed in 4-point type. The United
States Supreme Court, in an equally divided ruling,94 affirmed the Second
Circuit's holding that Alitalia could not claim the Convention's damage
limitation because the notice was inadequate. The Second Circuit char-
acterized the notice as "Lilliputian" and "virtually invisible," and held
that to allow the airline to deliver such a notice and claim the limitation
would render the Convention's terms meaningless. 95 The court further
88 Id. at 498.
89 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965), cert denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965).
90 Id. at 857.
91 id at 856-57. Similarly, in Manion v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 55 N.Y.2d 398, 434
N.E.2d 1060 (1982), the highest court in the State of New York held the limitation inapplicable since
the airline did not deliver a ticket until after the passenger had completed the first leg of her trip.
92 341 F.2d at 857.
93 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
94 Justice Marshall did not participate in the Supreme Court's decision, apparently because he
filed an amicus brief in Lisi as Solicitor General. Memorandum for Amicus United States (jurisdic-
tional stage) at 7, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
95 Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 370 F.2d 508, 514 (2d Cir. 1966).
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declared:
The Convention's arbitrary limitations on liability - which have been se-
verely and repeatedly criticized - are advantageous to the carrier. But the
quid pro quo for this one-sided advantage is delivery to the passenger of a
ticket and baggage check which gives him notice that on the air trip he is
about to take, the amount of recover to him or his family in the event of a
crash, is limited very substantially.9
Lis! was followed by Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp. 97, in which
the highest court in the State of New York unanimously held that deliv-
ery of a notice in 4.5-point type violated Article 3 of the Warsaw Con-
vention as a matter of law and resulted in liability for full damages. The
court held that "a statement which cannot reasonably be deciphered fails
of its purpose and function of affording notice and may not be accepted
as the sort of statement contemplated or required by the Convention.""8
It is evident that, unlike the majority in Chan, the courts in Warren,
Mertens, Lisi, and Egan each considered the language of Article 22 of the
Convention when interpreting the language of Article 3.99 Article 22
specifically provides that "the carrier and the passenger may agree to a
higher limit of liability."'" 0 If, as the Chan majority contends, a carrier
can benefit from the Convention's damage limitation by delivering a pas-
senger ticket that makes no mention of that limitation, then the passen-
ger is effectively deprived of his rights under Article 22. As the Second
Circuit said in Mertens:
[T]here would be little reason to make this provision, to require that the
ticket state that the liability of the carrier is limited (Article 3(l)(e)), and to
require that such a ticket be delivered to the passenger unless the Conven-
tion also required that the ticket be delivered in such circumstances as to
afford the (assenger a reasonable opportunity to take ... self-protective
measures.
96 Id at 512-13 (footnote omitted). The United States government supported the Second Cir-
cuit's holding. Memorandum for Amicus United States (jurisdictional stage) at 7, Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane, S.p.A. v. Lisi, 390 U.S. 455 (1968). In addition, Lisi has been cited with approval
and applied by various United States Courts, including the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. See eg., Deutsche Lufthansa v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 479 F.2d 912, 917
(D.C. Cir. 1973); DeMarines v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 580 F.2d 1193, 1198 n.11 (3d Cir.
1987); Block v. Compagnie Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 325 n.2 & 334 n.32 (5th Cir. 1967).
97 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199 (1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968).
98 I d at 169, 234 N.E.2d at 203.
99 The Court in Chan noted that several courts, including the courts in Warren, Mertens, Lisi,
and Egan, have equated non-delivery of a ticket, for purposes of Article 3(2), with the delivery of a
ticket in a form that fails to provide adequate notice of the Warsaw limitation. The Chan Court then
stated, "We cannot accept this interpretation." Chan, 109 S. CL at 1680.
100 Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art 22. The right to contract for a higher liability limit was
an essential part of the Convention throughout its drafting history. The first draft proposals in-
cluded that right. See Anmicus Brief, supra note 55, at 21 n.16.
101 341 F.2d 851, 857 (2d Cir. 1965).
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In sum, the Chan majority's holding, that a carrier can benefit from
the Convention's damage limitation by delivering a passenger ticket that
makes no mention of that limitation, makes little sense when the Conven-
tion's drafting history is examined and when the articles of the Conven-
tion are considered as a whole. Justice Scalia erred in considering the
language of Article 3 in isolation. Rather, he should have viewed the
language of Article 3 in light of the overall purposes of the Convention.
By relying on a literal reading of Article 3 for his assertions, Justice
Scalia failed to give the specific words of the Convention a meaning con-
sistent with the expectations of the contracting parties."0 2 As Judge
Learned Hand stated, "words are such temperamental beings that the
surest way to lose their essence is to take them at their face." 10 3
As a consequence of the Court's decision, international carriers have
been given a one-sided advantage. A carrier embarking on an interna-
tional flight can now benefit from the Convention's damage limitation
without providing its passengers with a reasonable opportunity to take
self-protective measures. These passengers effectively have been robbed
of the opportunity to alter the amount of recovery available to them or
their families in the event of a crash.
C. Failing to Read the Montreal Agreement in Conjunction with the
Warsaw Convention
Both the majority and the concurrence in Chan failed to appreciate
the special relationship between the Montreal Agreement and the War-
saw Convention. The Montreal Agreement is by its very terms a "special
contract" under Article 22(1) of the Warsaw Convention." 04 Article
22(1) of the Convention provides that "by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability."105 The Agree-
ment "is consistent with the terms of the Convention and does not pur-
port, or need, to 'amend' the Convention itself in order to be legally
effective."" 6 Although the Montreal Agreement binds only the carriers
102 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985).
103 1942 Address by Judge Hand to the Massachusetts Bar Association.
104 Montreal Agreement, supra note 3.
105 The entire text of Article 22(1) reads as follows:
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger shall be
limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which
the case is submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodic payments, the equivalent
capital value of the said payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special
contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability. Warsaw Conven-
tion, supra note 3, art. 22(1).
106 Amicus Brief, supra note 55, at 25. While the Agreement is a private agreement among carri-
ers, it is approved by the United States government. In addition, the United States obtained formal
assurance of foreign governments whose carriers were participating in the Agreement that those
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who are parties to it, it is fair to hold those carriers to the bargain
struck. 107 Korean Air Lines signed the Agreement in 1969.108
The Montreal Agreement sets forth explicitly the notice of limita-
tion of liability which is required to be printed "in types at least as large
as 10 point and in ink contrasting with the stock .... ,o Hence, the
parties to the Agreement have been give notice of the 10-point type stan-
dard and have agreed to its strict adherence. In return, they have bene-
fited from the Agreement's $75,000 damage limitation.110 As Solicitor
General Fried observed, the standard, "once declared, hardly seems the
sort to make ready compliance burdensome. Indeed, in many respects,
the 10-point type standard would seem far preferable to air carriers than
the more vague standard that notice must be 'adequate.' "II
In any event, the 10-point type standard should be applied because it
is the measure adopted in 1963 by the Civil Aeronautics Board
("CAB"),112 the agency then responsible for determining the sufficiency
of such notice on passenger tickets. Even before the Montreal Agree-
ment, the CAB executed a rule requiring foreign air carriers to furnish a
statement of liability limitations with each ticket in at least 10-point
type. 1 3 Although that rule did not profess to construe the Warsaw Con-
vention itself, there is no reason why a court should apply a different
standard of adequacy in Warsaw Convention cases within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States.' 14
Indeed, the 10-point type notice requirement has been adopted by
both the Second and Fifth Circuits." 5 In In re Air Crash Disaster at
Warsaw, Poland,"6 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that an
governments would permit the Agreement to go into effect subject only to termination on twelve
months' notice. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 66, at 593-94.
107 Amicus Brief, supra note 55, at 25-26.
108 Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1678. All foreign airlines must sign the Agreement as a condition of their
Foreign Air Carrier Permit, which allows the conduct of business in the United States. See 14
C.F.R_ § 213.7 (1990).
109 Montreal Agreement, supra note 3.
110 As the Solicitor General stated in his amicus brief to the Chan Court:
[Tihere is no bar to the air carriers agreeing to comply with the Convention's notice require-
ment in a particular manner. Certainly, the carriers are hard pressed to argue that a violation of
the Montreal Agreement's notice standard is unrelated to the requirements of the Warsaw Con-
vention, in implementation of which the Montreal Agreement was executed. Amicus Brief,
supra note 55, at 10-11.
111 Id. at 12.
112 The Civil Aeronautics Board is now known as the Department of Transportation.
113 14 C.F.R. § 221.175(a) (1990).
114 Amicus Brief, supra note 55, at 26-27.
115 See, In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S.
845 (1983); In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana, 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986).
116 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983).
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airline's use of 8.5-point type rather than 10-point type to inform passen-
gers of liability limitations prevented it from raising defenses under Arti-
cle 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention.'1 7 In its discussion of the Montreal
Agreement, the Second Circuit observed:
The 10-point guideline is a clear one, and quite easy to follow. To be sure,
any such line drawing has an arbitrary air, but [the airline] is a party to the
line drawn and it seems to us less arbitrary to accept the 10-point standard
than it would be to guess on a case-by-case basis at what constitutes 'ade-
quate notice.' 18
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Air Crash
Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana,'1 9 held that the $75,000 limitation
for the wrongftl death of an international traveler did not apply where
the notice of liability given to the decedents was in 9-point type, "not in
the required 10-point type."120 The Fifth Circuit stated that "10-point
type means exactly that, 10-point type.' 21
The majority in Chan held that a carrier can benefit from the War-
saw Convention's damage limitation by delivering a ticket that makes no
mention of that limitation. Thus, the majority did not address the ques-
tion of whether the Montreal Agreement's 10-point type requirement
supplies the standard of adequate notice under Article 3 of the Conven-
tion. While the concurrence did address this question, it failed to adopt
the Montreal Agreement's 10-point standard, stating only that "some
minimal level of adequacy is required...., 2 2
The concurrence's view ignores the relationship between the Mon-
treal Agreement and the Warsaw Convention. By substituting an un-
clear standard for a clear one, the concurrence "undermines the certainty
needed by air carriers, passengers, and courts alike. It also fails to give
appropriate weight to the Executive Branch's judgment regarding the re-
lationship between type size and notice to passengers.' 123
V. CONCLUSION
The Chan majority's conclusion that the delivery of a ticket invokes
the Warsaw Convention's damage limit, irrespective of whether the air-
line gives any warning to the passenger, violates both the language and
the history of the Convention. By relying on a literal reading of the Con-
117 Id at 91.
118 Id at 90 n.10.
119 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986).
120 I d at 1098.
121 Id.
122 Chan, 109 S. CL at 1693 n.16 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
123 Amicus Brief, supra note 55, at 24.
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vention for its assertions, the Chan majority has given international air
carriers an undeserved, one-sided advantage. As a result of this decision,
international travelers effectively have been denied the opportunity to al-
ter the amount of recovery available to them or their families in the event
of a crash. While it is true that the language of Article 3 of the Conven-
tion should have been relevant to the majority's decision, it should not
have become, as Justice Frankfurter stated, a "verbal prison." 24 If the
majority had viewed the language of article 3 in light of the drafting
history and overall purposes of the Convention, it would have found that
adequate warning is an indispensable prerequisite for claiming the liabil-
ity limitation.
Unlike the Chan majority, the concurrence, after considering the
drafting history of the Convention and its Articles as a whole, correctly
resolved the fundamental issue by ruling that adequate notice is a prereq-
uisite for claiming the damage limit. However, Justice Brennan replaced
a clear standard of adequate notice with an unclear one by failing to
appreciate the relationship between the Montreal Agreement and the
Warsaw Convention.
It is evident that the Montreal Agreement is, as its title states, an
"Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol." '125 The Agreement's specific notice require-
ment is plainly intended to define the manner in which the Warsaw Con-
vention's corresponding notice provision is to be satisfied. 126 The
carriers who signed the Agreement are aware of both the liability limita-
tion and the requirement of a particular form of notice. According to the
concurrence's confusing ruling, these carriers can benefit from the
$75,000 liability limitation while simultaneously ignoring the 10-point
type notice requirement.
If, as Justice Brennan correctly contends, "some minimal level of
adequacy is required," 12 7 then certainly it is better to have a clear, settled
standard than it is to require courts and juries to conjecture on a case-by-
case basis as to what constitutes "adequate notice." Surely such a dis-
jointed approach would not further the Warsaw Convention's goal of
"uniformity" in international air transportation.12
Ian A. Schwartz
124 Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335, 358 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
125 Montreal Agreement, supra note 3.
126 Amicus Brief, supra note 55, at 25.
127 Chan, 109 S. Ct. at 1693 n.16 (Brennan, 3., concurring in the judgment).
128 Amicus Brief, supra note 55, at 27 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.,
466 U.S. 243, 256 (1984)).
